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DETERMINISM OE EREE WILL —
THE NEW METAPHYSICS
A Strange Scientific Aberration
BV VICTOR S. YARROS
TV 4'L'CH has been written and said in recent years concerning the
alleged repudiation by modern science and scientific philosophy
of the rigid mechanical determinism of the nineteenth century, or of
the idea of an unescapable, all-pervasive Law governing Nature in
all of its manifestations. According to many thinkers, the new
physics has overthrown the old metaphysics and, among other revo-
lutionary things, has restored the belief in moral freedom, or the
freedom of the human will.
It scarcely needs adding that in the camps of the fundamentalist
theologians and old moralists these admissions, or proclamations, have
caused much rejoicing.
But are the admissions well founded? Must we gi\e up the Deter-
minism, the doctrine that law reigns throughout the Universe, and
conclude that beyond a certain realm chaos marks the operations
of Nature ?
True, these startling assertions have been made by eminent physi-
cists, astronomers and mathematicians — Jeans, Eddington, and
others. Rut have they sjioken on the subject in questions as scien-
tists, with the precision and caution characteristic of the man of
science or as speculative and pious men who leave the methods and
principles of science behind them on certain occasions?
The feeling is growing in scientific circles that the so-called
"princij-jle of uncertainty," or the New Indeterminism. has had its
day, and that the "revolutionary" rediscovery of free will was the
product of a series of singular misconceptions, oversights and
jumped-at inferences.
Let us quote the latest pronouncements of men of science on this
interesting question.
Professor C. G. Darwin, grandson of the great Charles Darwin,
writes as follows in his recent work on the modern conception of
matter
:
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The facts now known regarding the atoms and electrons
must revolutionize our ideas about one of the most fundamental
principles which has always been accepted in science—namely,
the principle of Causality. We are accustomed to take it for
granted that a full knowledge of the present would enable us
confidently to predict the future. When we are defeated in
our attempt at prophecy we attribue it to ignorance, with the
tacit assumption that, with more knowledge of the present, we
could have done better. It has never occurred to us that the
present is definitely unknowable.
It has been suggested that the new outlook will remove the
well-known philosophical conflict between the doctrines of free
will and determinism. If we are to find room for free will
within the realm governed by physical science, we have to sup-
pose that the motions of our own bodies are in some way free
not to obey the inexorable commands of the older mechanics.
At first sight it might appear that the Uncertainty principle
provides the necessary latitude, but this is contradicted by closer
consideration. We cannot say exactly what will happen to a
single electron, but we can confidently estimate the probabilities.
If an experiment is carried out with a thousand electrons, what
was probable for one becomes nearly a certainty. Physical
theory confidently predicts that the millions of electrons in our
bodies will behave even more regularly, and thus to find a case
of noticeable departure from the average, we should have to
wait for a time fantastically longer than the estimated age of
the universe. How, then, does the Uncertainty principle help
to free us from the bonds of determinism ?
In physics, continues Professor Darwin, ignorance has become
respectable, but it should be modest. It is, assuredly, a very poor
basis for a fabric of assumptions and speculations. We do not know
what a single electron will do. but we are not entitled to conclude that
the universe is chaotic, especially in view of the statistical averages
that are so constant. How can chaos lead so quickly to order and
law ?
It may be objected that Professor Darwin is not a distinguished
physicist. But the authority in the realm of the exact sciences of
Professor Max Planck and Professor Albert Einstein will not be
questioned by any one—not even by the new, speculative and pietistic
metaphysicians. Here is what these two great mathematicians and
physicists have said lately in a special interview on the so-called prin-
ciple of Indeterminism
:
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Prof. Planck : "Where the discrepancy comes today is not be-
tween nature and the principle of causality, but rather between the
picture we have made of nature and the realities in nature herself.
Our picture is not in perfect accord with our observation, but it
is the advancing business of science to bring about a finer accord.
I am convinced that the bringing about of the accord must take place
not in the rejection of causality, but in a greater enlargement of
the formula and a refinement of it, so as to meet modern discoveries."
Professor Einstein: "The notion of free will in inorganic nature
is not merely nonsense, it is objectionable nonsense.
"Physics gives no ground whatever for this notion of indetermi-
nacy. I am in entire agreement with our friend Planck in the stand
he has taken on this principle. He admits the imjjossibility of apply-
ing the causality principle to the inner processes of atomic physics
under the present state of afTairs, but he has set himself definitely
against the thesis that from this Unhrauchharkeit, or inapplicability,
we are to conclude that the process of causation does not exist in
external reality.
"The indeterminism which belongs to quantum physics is sub-
jective. It must be related to something, else indeterminism has no
meaning, and here it is related to our own inability to follow the
course of individual atoms and forecast their activities."
It is certainly a singular aberration to assert that our present
inability to follow certain processes and forecast the actions of indi-
vidual atoms proves that chaos exists in nature and. therefore, free
will in the human body-mind ! No writer has dealt with this amazing
aberration more bluntly or vigorously than Professor H. A. Levy,
of the Imperial College of Science and Technology. In a book en-
titled T}\c Universe of Science, as well as in certain articles and
reviews, he has analyzed the confusions and misunderstandings
which have led to the formulation of the so-called principle of in-
determinism. He does not spare the men of science who are
responsible for this "extraordinary muddle," and for the practical
mischief attributable to the revival of the free-will fallacy. We can-
not quote him at length here, but his main points may be summarily
stated as follows
:
The mathematician mistakes his reality for the reality, his set of
svmbols and formulas for the Universe. He forgets that the uni-
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verse of science is by no means the real universe, and that his picture
is necessarily incomplete and inexact.
In the second place, there is a limit to the fineness of perception
even of the best-equipped scientists when studying the structure of
matter, and there is, therefore, a limit below which it becomes physi-
cally impossible to disentangle or isolate the processes that go on
there.
This means that the scientist begins with a chaotic unit as his
basis, and builds upward. What is chaotic to him is not necessarily
chaotic intrinsically, and perhaps eventually he will be able to under-
stand his unit better. And if he should never understand it, all he
will be justified in saying is that, to him, that unit seems chaotic.
Rut in building up his universe, at every step law, not chaos, con-
fronts him : deterniinacy, not indeterminacy. Without determinacy,
there is no science, and there is no applied science—no art, no in-
dustry, no philosophy.
We can see now that it was a gratuitous blunder, at the start,
to speak of a "principle" of uncertainty in the name of quantum
physics. The term should have been "area," not principle, and the
uncertainty should have been attributed to physical reasons perfectly
well understood.
Bertrand Russell, in his new book. Religion and Science, dis-
cusses, among other problems, that of determinism versus caprice
in nature. Like Professor Levy, he is convinced that the new physics,
so-called, is dealing with something not yet determinable rather than
with something actually and necessarilv indeterniinafe. There is
no real reason, he says, for making the assumption that the unpre-
dictable behavior of minute particles of matter is sufficient evidence
that their behavior is not determined by any cause. That assumption
is wholly gratuitous and is, in many cases, inspired by wishful think-
ing, by the desire to infer free will in human beings from "free will"
in the atom or electron. As well contend, adds Mr. Russell, that
death has no causes, since we cannot predict what individuals will
die within a given period and what individuals will survive. Mor-
tality statistics prove, of course, that death has causes, and the statis-
tical laws of quantum mechanics likewise prove that atomic behavior
is determined by certain causes—causes as yet unknown to science.
The blunder of the mathematicians and physicists named above
led to the greater and more pathetic blunder of the theologians and
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inelaph}-sicians who hastened to proclaim the vindication or triumph
of free will in man. Since, the latter declared, we do not know what
the indi\idral electron will do, it follows that the human will is a
law unto itself, and that our actions are determined hy ourselves!
Thus our moral freedom is regained and our moral responsibilitv
restored.
But these propositions will not bear anything like a critical ex-
amination. Just what is meant by moral freedom or free will ?" These
phrases need scientific definition. They certainly do not define
themselves.
To begin with the "will," psychologists tell us that there is no
inde])endent, identifiable, attthentic factilty that can be called the
"will."' Our action, our choice, in any given situation depends on
the issue of a conflict within ourselves, a conflict of motives, desires,
hopes, fears, ambitions. In the miser, for example, greed and cu-
pidity always, or nearly always, prevail in the end, over the weaker
sentiments or tendencies. In the generous, benevolent, sensitive per-
son, the desire to help, to prevent or alleviate suffering, prevails.
The coward may be ashamed of his timidty and cowardice, but he
runs away : the brave man is not without fear, but he manages to
control and overcome that ignoble emotion, and he faces danger
with apparent calm and steadiness.
Xow, w^hy are some generous and others callous and selfish ? Why
are some brave and others cowardly ? Such questions cannot be an-
swered, dogmatically. But w^e know that behavior is socially condi-
tioned to a very great extent, although hereditary factors are not
without importance. We are born with certain potentialities, ten-
dencies, disposition, but these can be encouraged or discouraged,
curbed or developed, by environment and education. The same per-
son mav be a hero under certain circumstances and a bandit under
others.
Can we predict the behavior of this or that individual? Xot
always, and not with absolute confidence. We never fully know
aiix individual—not even ourselves. The springs of human action
are not all visible. Hidden motives may come to the surface under
certain stimuli. The sub-conscious may emerge into the light of
day. A desire normally weak may be reenforced by some other
motive, in itself also perhaps insufficient.
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However, it is equally true, and equally important, that the be-
havior of men en masse, or even of large groups of men, is predic-
table. Practical psychology acts upon this basic fact. Advertisers,
manufacturers, merchants, sales agents, directors of personnel have
learned from experience to expect certain responses to certain ap-
peals or challenges. What is true of electrons, therefore, is true
of human beings—there are statistical averages that illustrate and
prove the reign of law in both classes of cases.
The individual sense of moral freedom is, then, an illusion. We
are not "free." but we are ignorant and uncertain, because we do
not know what our ultimate decision will be in any difficult case
requiring consideration from several points of view. When we hesi-
tate and postpone a decision, we tacitly recognize our lack of freedom
to act. Something in us tells us that it would be unwise or unsafe
to take a final step. Time allows new motives to assert themselves.
Time thus removes doubts and perplexities, and then we feel that
our decision is deliberate, not likely to cause subsequent regret. At
no moment were we free to act ; the struggle was internal, between
motives, loyalties, benefits and possible disadvantages.
Analysis of the arguments for free Will shows that the fervent
adherents of that theory are prompted by the apprehension that the
denial of moral freedom involves the denial of the power and influ-
ence of non-material factors, and that determinism is incompatible
with social and moral progress. If everything is determined before-
hand, they say to themselves, then it is idle to make any appeal to
reason or conscience, and attempts at guidance toward worthy stand-
ards are utterly futile. There is no escape from causality, and fatal-
ism thus imposes itself upon all intelligent persons.
But such a line of reasoning is the product of confusion. Deter-
minism is not another name for fatalism, and is not incompatible
with moral responsibility rightly understood. An apppeal to reason
or to conscience is an appeal to recognized human motives and
forces, and such an appeal implies causality, for the motive or con-
sideration invoked may become the cause of desired eflfects. An
appeal to a "better self" is an appeal to sentiments as real as those
we associate with the worse self. Indeed, what used to be called the
sense of sin is nothing but the dissatisfaction of the better self, its
revolt against inferior standards. It is the sense of unworthiness,
of falling short, of doing an injustice to oneself.
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It IS the principle for causation, of determinism, that leads us to
cultivate certain habits, to establish certain institutions, to create cer-
tain conditions. We know that human nature is remarkably plastic
and riexible. Adults, like children, are molded by their surround-
ings. They are affected by examples : they are tempted to imitate
and emulate. They are restrained by fear, emboldened by evidence
of success or impunity.
In short, determinism is at the root of our schools, our churches,
our courts, our legislatures. Every form of propaganda assumes
determinism and proves it in practice.
We have said enough to show that the fashionable talk about the
alleged incongruities of modern scientific and philosophic thought is
without warrant in fact. C. E. M. Joad, a British thinker of note,
recently made the following remark: "While psychology, the science
of mind, seems increasingly disposed to admit the existence only of
the body, physics the science of matter seems increasingly disposed
to postulate the reality only of mind." Surely no scientific psycholo-
gist or physicist will indorse such a loose statement as this. As
already indicated modern psycholog}- is not rash enough to dismiss
the mind. It cannot separate the mind from the body nor the body
from the mind. Hence the term—body-mind. Phenomena may begin
as simple sensations, but they end as mental processes. Where does
the translation take place? We do not know. Somehow the dance
of electrons is converted into what we call an idea, a thought, a
proposition. The chaos in the atom does not preclude systematic
thinking, the framing of theories, the formulation of principles and
laws of science, the building of synthetic philosophies.
The incongruities of modern thought are the incongruities of
half-baked thought, of pseudo-science. The scientist who is aware
of the nature of his particular "reality," as Professor Levy has said,
falls into no paradoxical and wanton errors.
After all, as has been said again and again, the method and spirit
of science are far more important than any set of theories or con-
clusions. The method and spirit of science forbid the man of science
to indulge in sweeping generalizations or dogmatic assertions, and
they forbid him even more sternly to invade fields not his own and
run riot in them.
Professor Benedetto Croce holds that all errors are moral, and
that there is no such thing as a "mistake of the head." What he
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means, of course, is that all statements should he properly qualified,
regarded as tentative and subject to correction. It was, therefore,
a moral error, and a mischievous one. to proclaim the end of deter-
minism and the triumph of anarchy, or of free will. Ignorance may
have become, for the moment, respectable, in the words of Professor
Darwin, but it is absurd to glory in our ignorance or to use it as
foundation for a new metaphysics or a new theology.
